Abstract. We introduce the notion of resource-fair protocols. Informally, this property states that if one party learns the output of the protocol, then so can all other parties, as long as they expend roughly the same amount of resources. As opposed to previously proposed definitions related to fairness, our definition follows the standard simulation paradigm and enjoys strong composability properties. In particular, our definition is similar to the security definition in the universal composability (UC) framework, but works in a model that allows any party to request additional resources from the environment to deal with dishonest parties that may prematurely abort.
Introduction
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) is one of the most fundamental problems in cryptography. At a high level, the problem is concerned with n parties, each holding a private input x i , that want to compute a function (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n ) ← f (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) so that each party learns its own output y i , but no other information is revealed, even in the presence of malicious parties that may deviate arbitrarily from the protocol [6, 16, 35, 36, 57, 58] .
Nowadays it is widely accepted to define the security of an MPC protocol using a simulation paradigm, where two experiments are presented: one real-world experiment that models the actual setting in which a protocol takes place, and one ideal process where an ideal functionality performs the desired computation. The security of a protocol is defined (informally) as the existence of an ideal adversary in the ideal process that simulates the real-world experiment for any given real-world adversary. Many simulationbased security definitions in various models have been proposed [3, 11, 12, 35, 38, 46, 52] . The universal composability (UC) framework of Canetti [12] is among the models that provide perhaps the strongest security guarantee in the following sense: a protocol π that is secure in this framework is guaranteed to remain secure when arbitrarily composed with other protocols, by means of a "composition theorem."
Fair Multi-Party Computation
In this paper we investigate a less studied aspect of MPC, namely, fairness. Informally, a protocol is fair if either all the parties learn the output of the function, or no party learns anything (about the output). This property is also known as "complete fairness," and can be contrasted with "partial fairness," where fairness is achieved only when there are certain restrictions on corruptions of parties [38] ; 1 see also [28] . Clearly, fairness is a very desirable property for MPC protocols, and in fact, many of the security definitions cited above imply fairness. (See [38] for an overview of different types of fairness, along with their corresponding histories.)
Here we briefly describe some known results about (complete) fairness. Let n be the total number of participating parties and t the number of corrupted parties. It is known that if t < n/3, then fairness can be achieved without any set-up assumptions, both in the information-theoretic setting [6, 16] and in the computational setting [35, 36] (assuming the existence of trapdoor permutations). If t < n/2, one can still achieve fairness if all parties have access to a broadcast channel; this also holds both information theoretically [54] and computationally [35, 36] . Unfortunately, the above fairness results no longer hold when t ≥ n/2, i.e., when a majority of the parties are corrupted. In fact, it was proved that there do not exist fair MPC protocols in this case, even when parties have access to a broadcast channel [18, 35] . Intuitively, this is because the adversary, controlling a majority of the corrupted parties, can abort the protocol prematurely and always gain some unfair advantage. This impossibility result easily extends to the so-called common reference string (CRS) model, where there is a common string drawn from a prescribed distribution available to all the parties. Thus, given this negative result, much of prior research on the case of a corrupted majority focuses on protocols with weakened fairness properties, ranging from being partially fair to completely unfair. For example, the basic UC framework is, by definition, completely unfair.
Nevertheless, fairness is still important (and necessary) in many applications in which at least half the parties may be corrupted. One such application is contract signing (or more generally, the fair exchange of signatures) by two parties [7] . To achieve some form of fairness, various approaches have been explored. One such approach adds to the model a trusted third party, who is essentially a judge that can be called in to resolve disputes between the parties. (There is a large body of work following this approach; see, e.g., [2, 10] and references therein.) This approach requires that the trusted external party be permanently available, in case disputes arise. (This is in contrast to, for example, the so-called PKI model, where after the public/secret keys for the parties are generated, the trusted party is no longer needed.) Another recent approach adds to the model a physical communication assumption called an "envelope channel," which might be described as a "trusted postman" [45] . (Refer to Sect. 1.4 for work ensuing the publication of this paper.)
A different approach that avoids the available trusted party requirement uses a mechanism known as "gradual release," where parties take turns to release their secrets in a "bit by bit" fashion. Therefore, if a corrupted party aborts prematurely, it is only a little "ahead" of the honest party, and the honest party can "catch up" by investing an amount of time that is comparable to (and maybe greater than) the time spent by the adversary. (Note that this is basically an ad hoc notion of fairness.) Early works in this category include [4, 7, 22, 26, 30, 37] . More recent work has focused on making sureunder the assumption that there exist problems, such as modular exponentiation, that are not well suited for parallelization 2 -that this "unfairness" factor is bounded by a small constant [9, 32, 53] . As we discuss below, our constructions also use a gradual release mechanism secure against parallelization attacks.
Resource Fairness
In this paper we propose a new notion of fairness with a rigorous simulation-based security definition (without a trusted third party), that allows circumvention of the impossibility result discussed above in the case of corrupted majorities. We call this new notion resource fairness. In a nutshell, resource fairness means that if any party learns the output of a function, then all parties will be able to learn the output of the function by expending roughly the same amount of resources. (In our case, the resource will be time.) In order to model this, we allow honest parties in our framework (both in the real world and in the ideal process) to request resources from the environment, and our definition of resource fairness relates the amount of requested resources to the amount of resources available to corrupted parties.
Slightly more formally, a resource-fair functionality can be described in two steps. We start with the most natural notion for a fair functionality F . A critical feature of a fair functionality is the following:
• There are certain messages that F sends to multiple parties such that all of them must receive the message in the same round of communication. (For this it is necessary that the adversary in the ideal process cannot block messages from F to the honest parties.) 3 Then we modify it using a "wrapper" to obtain a functionality W(F ). The wrapper allows the adversary to make "deals" of roughly the following kind:
• Even if F requires a message to be simultaneously delivered to all parties, the adversary can "invest" computational resources and obtain the message from W(F ) in an earlier communication round.
• However, in this case, W(F ) will offer a "fair deal" to the honest parties: each of them will be given the option of obtaining its message by investing (at most) the same amount of computational resources as invested by the adversary.
Once we define W(F ) as our ideal notion of a fair functionality, we need to define when a protocol is considered to be as fair as W(F ). We follow the same paradigm as used in the UC framework for defining security: A protocol π is said to be as fair as W(F ) if for every real adversary A there exists an ideal adversary (simulator) S such that no environment can distinguish between interacting with A and parties running a protocol π (the real world), and interacting with S and parties talking to W(F ) (the ideal world). But in addition we require that S cannot invest much more resources than A has. This last condition is crucial for the notion of resource fairness. To see this, note the following:
• In the ideal world, in the event of the adversary S obtaining a message by investing some amount of resources, an honest party can be required to invest the same amount of resources to get its message.
• By the indistinguishability condition, this is the same as the amount of resources required by the honest parties in the real world. Thus, the resources required by the honest parties in the real world can be as much as that invested by the adversary S in the ideal world.
Recall that the (intuitive) notion of resource fairness requires that the resources required by an honest party in the real world should be comparable to what the adversary A (in the real world) expends, to obtain its output. Thus, to achieve the notion, we must insist 3 In the original formulation of the UC framework [12] , the adversary in the ideal process could block the outputs from the ideal functionality to all the parties. Thus, the ideal process itself is already completely unfair, and therefore discussing fair protocols is not possible. The new version [13] also has "immediate functionalities" as the default-see Sect. 2.1.
that the amount of resources invested by the ideal-world adversary S is comparable to what the real-world adversary A expends. Note that for these comparisons, the resources in the ideal world must be measured using the same units as in the real world. However, these invested resources do not have a physical meaning in the ideal world: it is just a "currency" used to ensure that the fairness notion is correctly reflected in the ideal-world process.
The only resource we shall consider in this work is computation time-i.e., number of steps.
Fairness Through Gradual Release Our definition is designed to capture the fairness guarantees offered by the method of gradual release. The gradual release method by itself is not new, but our simulation-based definition of fairness is.
Typical protocols using gradual release consist of a "computation" phase, where some computation is carried out, followed by a "revealing" phase, where the parties gradually release their private information towards learning a result y. Our simulation-based definition requires one to be able to simulate both the computation phase and the release phase. In contrast, previous ad hoc security definitions did not require this, and consisted, explicitly or implicitly, of the following three conditions:
1. The protocol must be completely simulatable up to the revealing phase. 2. The revealing phase must be completely simulatable if the simulator knows y. 3. If the adversary aborts in the revealing phase and computes y by brute force in time t, then all the honest parties can compute y in time comparable to t. 4 While carrying some intuition about security and fairness, we note that these definitions are not fully simulation-based. To see this, consider a situation where an adversary A aborts (with, say, probability 1/2) early on in the revealing phase, such that it is still infeasible for A to find y by brute force. At this time, it is also infeasible for the honest parties to find y by brute force. Now, how does one simulate A's view in the revealing phase? Notice that the revealing phase is simulatable only if the ideal adversary S knows y. However, since nobody learns y in the real world, they should not learn y in the ideal world, and, in particular, S should not learn y. Thus, the above approach gives no guarantee that S can successfully simulate A's view. In other words, by aborting early in the revealing phase, A might gain some unfair advantage. Furthermore, previous definitions did not address the issue of protocol composition. Not just the fairness, but even the security under such definitions does not give any guarantees in an environment with concurrent executions. In addition, they leave open the possibility that the adversary can gain unfair advantages through malicious protocol interleaving.
Environment's Role
In our formulation of fairness, if a protocol is aborted, the honest parties get the option of investing resources and recovering a message from the functionality. However, the decision of whether to exercise this option is not specified by the protocol itself, but left to the environment. Just being provided with this option is considered fair. The fairness guarantee is that the amount of resources that need to be invested by the adversary to recover the message will be comparable to what the honest party requires. Whether the adversary actually makes that investment or not is not known to the honest parties. We point out that in a previous version of this work [34] , the protocol itself was able to decide whether or not to invest computational resources and recover a message from an aborted protocol. Further, for being fair, we required that if the adversary could have obtained its part of the message, then the protocol must carry out the recovery. This avoids leaving the decision of carrying out the computation to the environment, at the price however of the protocol needing to be aware of the computational power of the adversary (up to a constant).
Leaving the recovery decision to the environment has the consequence that our notion of fairness becomes a robust "relative" notion. In some cases the execution might be (intuitively) unfair if, for instance, the environment refuses to grant any requests for resources. However, this is analogous to the situation in the case of security: some environments can choose to reveal all the honest parties' inputs to the adversary. The protocol's guarantee is limited to mimicking the ideal functionality (which by definition is secure and fair). We do not seek to incorporate absolute guarantees of fairness (or security) into the protocol, as they are dependent on the environment.
Our Results
We summarize the main results presented in this paper.
1.
A fair multi-party computation framework. We start with a framework for fair multi-party computation (FMPC), which is a variation of the UC framework, but with modifications so that it is possible to design functionalities such that the ideal process is (intuitively) fair. We then present a generic wrapper functionality, denoted W(·), that converts a fair functionality into one that allows for a resourcefair realization in the real world. We then present definitions for resource-fair protocols that securely realize functionalities in this framework. We emphasize that these definitions are in the (standard) simulation paradigm 5 This functionality (more specifically, a wrapped version of it) lies at the heart of our constructions of resource-fair MPC protocols. We then construct an efficient resource-fair protocol GradRel that securely realizes F CPFO , assuming static corruptions. Our protocol uses a new variant of a cryptographic primitive known as time-lines [31] , which enjoys a property that we call strong pseudorandomness. In turn, the construction of time-lines hinges on a refinement of the generalized BBS assumption [9] , which has broader applicability.
3. Efficient and resource-fair MPC protocols. By using the W(F CPFO ) functionality, many existing secure MPC protocols can be easily transformed into resource-fair protocols while preserving their security. In particular, we present two such constructions. The first construction converts the universally composable MPC protocol by Canetti et al. [15] into a resource-fair MPC protocol that is secure against static corruptions in the CRS model in the FMPC framework. Essentially, the only thing we need to do here is to replace an invocation of a functionality in the protocol called "commit-and-prove" by our W(F CPFO ) functionality. The second construction turns the efficient MPC protocol by Cramer et al. [21] into a resource-fair one in the "public key infrastructure" (PKI) model in a similar fashion. The resulting protocol becomes secure and resource fair (assuming static corruptions) in the FMPC framework, while preserving the efficiency of the original protocol-an additive overhead of only O(κ 2 n) bits of communication and an additional O(κ) rounds, for κ the security parameter.
As mentioned above, the focus of this paper is on coping with static corruptions (meaning that the adversary is only allowed to decide what parties to corrupt at the onset of the computation), yielding conceptually simpler and efficient constructions. However, we note that there is a natural extension of our wrapper functionality that is suitable for adaptive adversaries; similarly, our composition theorem and proof hold whether we consider the setting of static or of adaptive adversaries.
Related Work
An overview of results and approaches related to fairness was already presented in Sect. 1.2. Subsequent to the publication of this work, further progress has been made in the area of fair MPC. In [40] , Gordon et al. showed that, although it cannot be achieved in general, as mentioned above [18] , complete fairness is possible in the two-party setting for certain non-trivial functions. In [39] , Gordon and Katz show the feasibility of partial fairness in secure two-party computation with respect to an alternate simulationbased definition of security in the real/ideal-world paradigm. Their approach does not involve the notion of resources that are obtained at run-time, and hence retains the simplicity of the original UC security, but invariably requires the number of rounds in the protocol to increase polynomially with the level of security (indistinguishability of simulation) required. Note that in contrast, in the standard notion of security, simulation is required to be only negligibly distinguishable for a protocol of a fixed polynomial number of rounds. Assuming enhanced trapdoor permutations exist, they present protocols meeting their definition, for general secure function evaluation (SFE) functionalities for which at least one of the domains or ranges is polynomial in size.
Cleve's impossibility result for fair MPC [18] actually follows from his showing the impossibility of unbiased two-party coin-flipping protocols when one of the parties is malicious; specifically, that for any two-party r-round coin-flipping protocol there exists an efficient adversary that can bias the output of the honest party by Ω( [27, 43, 44] for fair MPC. They show negative results for primitives that are "short,"
as measured by the length of the input provided by the two parties; specifically, that no primitive of length O(log k) can be complete, where k is the security parameter, and that there exist a "fairness hierarchy," in that for every short , no protocol making (serial) access to any -bit primitive can be used to construct even a ( + 1)-bit simultaneous broadcast protocol [17] . On the positive side, they show a k-bit primitive that is complete for two-party fair secure computation, and show how to generalize this result to the multi-party setting. See [41] for further details.
Organization of the Paper
The paper has two main components: the formalization of the notion of resource fairness, and protocol constructions satisfying this notion. In Sect. 2 we present the new notion, while Sect. 3 is dedicated to explaining the protocol constructions. In more detail, in Sect. 2 we first describe the FMPC framework, introduce "wrapped" functionalities, give security and fairness definitions, and finally state and prove a composition theorem. In Sect. 3, we first present the F CPFO functionality and a protocol that realizes a wrapped version of it, which we then use to achieve resource-fair MPC. The numbertheoretic assumptions used in these constructions, as well as our new time-line variant, are also presented in this section. Some refinements and extensions, as well as a brief description of the universal composability framework are given in the Appendix A.
FMPC Framework and Resource Fairness
In this section we first describe the FMPC framework, followed by the presentation of wrapper functionalities, followed by the definition of our new fairness notion and a proof of its universal composability property.
The FMPC Framework
The new framework used in our paper, which we call the fair multi-party computation (FMPC) framework, is similar to the universal composability (UC) framework [12, 13] . In particular, there are n parties, P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n , a real-world adversary A, an ideal adversary S, an ideal functionality F , and an environment Z. However, FMPC contains some modifications so that our notion of fairness becomes possible. We stress that the FMPC framework still inherits the strong security of UC, and we shall prove a composition theorem in the FMPC framework similar to UC.
Instead of describing the FMPC framework from scratch, we only discuss its most relevant features and differences from the UC framework. We present a brief overview of the UC framework in Appendix A; refer to [13] for a detailed presentation. The critical features of the FMPC framework are:
1. Interactive circuits/PRAMs. Instead of using interactive Turing machines as the underlying model of distributed computation, in the FMPC framework we use non-uniform interactive PRAMs (IPRAMs). 6 This is a non-trivial distinction, since we will work with exact time bounds in our security definition, and the "equivalence" between various computation models does not carry over there. The reason to make this modification is that, we will need to model machines that allow for simulation and subroutine access with no significant overhead. Thus, if we have two protocols, and one calls the other as a black-box, then the total running time of the two protocols together will be simply the sum of their running times. Obviously, Turing machines are not suitable here.
We say an IPRAM is t-bounded if it runs for a total of at most t steps. 7 We always assume that t is a polynomial of the security parameter κ, though for simplicity we do not explicitly write t (κ). We can view a t-bounded IPRAM as a "normal" IPRAM with an explicit "clock" attached to it that terminates the execution after a total number of t cumulative steps. It is important to note that an IPRAM is reactive: i.e., it can get activated multiple times and it maintains state across activations. A t-bounded IPRAM will run for at most t steps, totaled over all activations.
It will be convenient for us to refer to "compound IPRAMs," namely, a collection of two or more IPRAMs (interacting with each other and possibly with other IPRAMs in a well-defined manner), treated as a single entity. We introduce a shorthand to denote such compound IPRAMs:
An important compound IPRAM we shall refer to is Z, A , where Z is the environment and A the adversary. (In particular, we will refer to a bound on the running time of Z, A while formulating our definitions of fairness.) We shall also use this notation extensively in proving a universal composition theorem. 2. Synchronous communication with rounds. In the UC framework, the communication is asynchronous, and controlled by the adversary, and further there is no notion of time. This makes fair MPC impossible, since the adversary may, for example, choose not to deliver the final protocol message to an uncorrupted party P i . In this case, P i will never obtain the final result because it is never activated again. What is needed is to let parties be able to time out if they do not receive an expected message within some time bound. However, instead of incorporating a full-fledged notion of time into the model, for simplicity we shall work in a "synchronous model." Specifically, in the FMPC framework there will be synchronous rounds of communication in both the real world and the ideal process. (See [42, 49] for other synchronous versions of the UC framework.) In each round we allow the adversary to see the messages sent by other parties in that round, before generating its messages (i.e., we use a rushing adversary model).
Note that this model of communication is used in both the real and ideal worlds used for defining security. (As we shall see later, a resource-fair ideal functionality is designed to be aware of this round structure. This is necessary because the amount of resources required by an honest party to retrieve messages that the 7 Later, for an IPRAM for the adversary, we modify this bound to include the total amount of time units "invested" by the adversary as well as the number of steps it runs for. adversary blocks, is directly related to the number of communication rounds in the protocol that pass prior to that.) This allows also the environment to be aware of the round structure.
We stress that in our protocols, we use the synchronous communication model only as a substitute for having time-outs on messages (which are sequentially numbered). Our use of the synchronous model is only that if a message does not arrive in a communication round in which it is expected, then the protocol can specify an action to take.
For simplifying our protocols, we also incorporate an authenticated broadcast capability into our communication model. (We note that this is not essential for the definitions and composition theorem.) The broadcast can be used to ensure that all parties receive the same message; however no fairness guarantee is assumed: some parties may not receive a message broadcast to them. Indeed, such a broadcast mechanism can be replaced by resorting to, for instance, the broadcast protocol from [38] (with a slight modification to the ideal abstraction of broadcasting, to allow for the round structure in our synchronous model). 3. Guaranteed-round message delivery from functionalities. Following the revised formulation of the UC framework [13] , in our model the messages from an ideal functionality F are forwarded directly to the uncorrupted parties and cannot be blocked by S. 8 bounded a priori by a polynomial in the security parameter. But in our model, an honest party running a resource-fair protocol can "request" the environment to allow it extra computation time. A typical resource-fair protocol would instruct a party to make such a request when some other party aborts the protocol, and if the request is granted, use the additional resources to recover a result using bruteforce. If the request is granted, then the party can run for longer in its activations, for as many computation steps as granted by the environment. More formally, an honest party in the real-world execution can send a message of the form (dealoffer, sid, msg-id, β) to the environment; if the environment responds to this with (dealaccept, sid, msg-id), then the party gets a "credit" of β extra computational steps (which gets added to the credits it accumulated before). In a real-world protocol, these credits can be expended on computation.
Jumping ahead to the definition of the ideal world functionalities, we mention that these credits can be used also in a hybrid model, while interacting with a functionality. As described in Sect. 2.3, we shall consider functionalities which output a dealoffer message and accept in return a dealaccept message. Note that from the point of view of the environment, a party interacting with a such a function- 8 In the original UC formulation, messages from the ideal functionality F were forwarded to the uncorrupted parties by the ideal adversary S, who may block these messages and never actually deliver them. The ability of S to block messages from F makes the ideal process inherently unfair. ality can look indistinguishable from a party in the real-world execution making resource requests. We stress that the decision to grant or deny a resource request is made by the environment, arbitrarily. As we shall see, this still lets us define a meaningful notion of fairness of the protocols.
A Fair SFE Functionality
Before we introduce the notion of "wrapped functionalities," it is useful to note that in the model described above, we can construct a functionality that can be considered a fair secure function evaluation functionality F f . This functionality is similar to the homonymous functionality in the UC framework [12] , except for (1) the fact that there is no reference to the number of corrupted parties, as in our case it may be arbitrary, (2) the output is a single public value, instead of private outputs to each party, 9 (3) the added round structure-in particular, the adversary specifies the round at which the outputs are to be produced (deliverat message), 10 and (4) the use of the fair-delivery mechanism of the FMPC framework.
We emphasize that in the FMPC framework, and because F f uses the fair-delivery mechanism, it is easy to see that in the ideal model, the functionality F f satisfies the intuitive definition of fairness for secure function evaluation. (This is called "complete fairness" in [38] .) Specifically, if one party receives the output, all parties receive the output.
Wrapped Functionalities
The functionality F f described above is a fair functionality. Hence, following Cleve [18] , there is no protocol that could realize the functionality F f for many interesting functions f . Therefore we will create a relaxation of F f that can be realized, and that will be amenable to analysis in terms of resource fairness. To do this, we will actually construct a more general wrapper functionality which provides an interface to any (possibly reactive) functionality and will be crucial to defining resource fairness. We denote the wrapper functionality derived from a (fair) functionality F by W(F ). 11 The wrapper operates as follows. For ease of explanation, assume the functionality F schedules a single fair delivery to all parties with the same message. Basically, the wrapper handles this fair delivery by storing the message internally until the specified round for delivery, and then outputing the message to be delivered immediately to each party. It also allows the adversary S to invest resources and obtain the message in advance.
(Of course, in the ideal process, this investment is simply notational-the adversary does not actually expend any resources.) It will still deliver the message to each party at the specified round unless S offers a deal to a party to "expend" a certain amount of resources. If that party does not take the deal, then the wrapper will not deliver the message at any round. The wrapper enforces the condition that it only allows S to offer a deal for at most the amount of resources that S itself invested. Except for the messages discussed above, all communication to and from F are simply forwarded directly to and from F .
The formal definition of W(F ) is given in Fig. 2 . Here we provide some intuition behind some of the labels and variables. Let F (msg-id) denote a fairdeliver message record (containing message-destination pairs (msg i , P i ) and (msg S , S)), with identifier msg-id. Associated with any such record is a round number, which specifies the communication round in which the messages in that record will be delivered to all the parties and S. Initially each such record is marked unopened to signify that no party has received any of the messages yet. At any round the adversary S has the option of obtaining its messages (i.e., messages for the corrupt players and S) by investing α msg-id amount of resources. 12 If it does so, then the record is marked opened. Once a message is marked opened, W(F ) will ensure that each honest party is offered a fair deal. For each honest party P i this can happen in one of two ways: either the adversary offers a deal to the honest party to obtain its message msg i by investing at most α msg-id amount of resources (in which case the pair (msg i , P i ) is marked dealt), or if the adversary makes no such offer, then P i receives the message at the specified round without having to make any investment at all. Refer to Fig. 2 for the complete specification of W(F ). Fact 2.1. If the adversary obtains a message that was set for fair delivery with message ID msg-id, every honest party that is set to receive a message in the fair delivery with message ID msg-id will either receive it at the specified round, or will be offered a deal for at most the amount invested by the adversary.
To see why this is true, consider a set of messages that is set for fair delivery, as (fairdeliver, sid, msg-id, {(msg 1 , P i 1 ), . . . , (msg m , P i m ), (msg S , P S )}, j). The adversary can receive the messages (for the corrupt parties or for itself) in two ways only. The 11 Assuming F is a fair functionality, one could say that W(F ) is a "resource-fair" functionality. However, while a protocol that securely realizes F would be called a "fair" protocol, a protocol that securely realizes W(F ) would not be called a "resource-fair" protocol unless it satisfies an additional requirement, as discussed in Sect. 2.4. 12 This simply means that the adversary sends a message (invest, sid, msg-id, α msg-id ) to W(F ), and the amount α msg-id is counted towards the total amount of resources invested by S.
Wrapper functionality W(F )
W(F ) proceeds as follows, running with parties P 1 , . . . , P n , and an adversary S: It internally runs a copy of F .
• Whenever it receives an incoming communication, which is not one of the special messages (invest, noinvest, dealoffer and dealaccept), it immediately passes this message on to F . • Whenever F outputs any message not marked for fair delivery, output this message (i.e., pass it on to its destination, allowing the adversary to block this message).
The message record is marked unopened to indicate that the adversary has not yet obtained this message. Also all the pairs (msg i , P i ) in the record are marked undealt to indicate that no deal has been offered to the party P i for obtaining this message.
• If a record with ID msg-id is marked as unopened and the adversary sends a message (noinvest, sid, msg-id), then that record is erased (and the messages in it will not be delivered to any party).
• If msg-id is marked as unopened and the adversary S sends a message (invest, sid, msg-id, α), then -the record with ID msg-id is marked as opened, and α is stored as α msg-id . For each corrupt party P i , if the record contains the message (msg, P i ), that message is delivered to S immediately (even if the round j has not yet been reached). If the record contains (msg S , S) then that message is also delivered to S at this point.
• At any round in which a fairdeliver record (marked unopened or opened) is stored for delivery at that round, for every pair (msg, P ) in that record marked undealt, msg is output for immediate delivery to P (i.e., using the fair-delivery mechanism). Then that record is erased.
• If a record msg-id is marked as opened and the adversary sends (dealoffer, sid, msg-id, P i , β) for some honest party P i , then -W(F ) marks the pair (msg i , P i ) in the record msg-id as dealt, and sends (dealoffer, sid, msg-id, β ) to P i , where β = min(β, α msg-id ).
• If an honest party P i responds to (dealoffer, sid, msg-id, β) with (dealaccept, sid, msg-id, β), then the stored message msg i is immediately delivered to P i , and erased from the stored record.
a In a typical fair functionality, all messages from F could be marked for fair delivery. However we allow for non-fair message delivery also in the model. b A message record is identified using the ID msg-id, which F will ensure is unique for each record.
Fig. 2. The wrapper functionality W(F ).
first way is if it does not send any invest or noinvest messages to the functionality. In this case the record is never marked opened, no deal messages are sent, and all parties receive their messages in the specified round j . The second way is if it invests a value α. Then the record is marked opened. After this, if the adversary does not send a dealoffer message until round j , then again all honest parties receive their messages in round j . If the adversary does send a dealoffer message, then W(F ) offers a deal to each honest party to provide their messages if they invest β ≤ α. Note that we do allow the adver-sary to specify a value β for the deal, 13 but if β > α, then W(F ) ignores this value, and makes the offer at the value α. Note that the adversary can prevent all the messages in a record from being delivered (by sending a noinvest message), but this can be done only as long as the message is marked unopened. The above wrapper functionality was designed to capture the security and fairness guarantees we can obtain against static adversaries (i.e., adversaries which do not corrupt parties after the protocol execution has begun). There is a natural extension of the wrapper that is suitable for adaptive adversaries; however for simplicity we omit the details, since our protocols in Sect. 3 are secure only against static adversaries.
Conventions Below we clarify some of the conventions in the new framework.
• Using resource-requesting subroutines. A protocol interfaces with a resourcerequesting subroutine in a natural way. When a protocol ρ uses a subroutine π which makes resource requests (for instance, if π accesses a wrapped functionality W(F ), or if π securely realizes a wrapped functionality W(F )), it is for ρ to decide when to grant resource requests made by π . In the cases we consider, the outer protocol ρ will simply transfer resource requests it receives to its environment, and will transfer the resources granted to it back to the subroutine.
• Resource requests granted by the environment. We do not impose any restriction on the amount of resources that the environment can grant to the honest parties. In particular, the environment could grant a super-polynomial amount of resources to an honest party. This allows a wider class of environments for which the security guarantee holds. Jumping ahead, we point out that this does not render the system insecure, because of an extra condition that the entire system be simulatable in polynomial time, independent of the amount of resources granted by the environment. This requirement is captured in the definition of security using a device called the full simulator (see Definition 2.3).
• Dummy honest parties in the ideal world. An honest party in the ideal world is typically a "dummy" party. In the original UC framework this means that it acts as a transparent mediator in the communication between the environment and the ideal functionality. In our framework too this is true, but now the interaction also involves dealoffer and dealaccept messages. • A's resources in a hybrid model. When working in the W(F )-hybrid model, the convention regarding bounding the resources of the adversary A needs special attention: any amount of resources that A sends as investment to W(F ) gets counted towards its running time. That is, if A is a t-bounded IPRAM, then the total amount invested by it plus the total number of steps it runs is at most t.
Security and Fairness Definitions
So far we have described the ideal-world notion of fairness. As mentioned in Sect. 1.2, for a protocol to be resource fair, for each real-world adversary A, the ideal-world adversary S built to simulate the protocol should be such that the amount of resources S 13 The exact amount of resources that the honest party will need to request from the environment will depend on the specifics of the real-world protocol. We would like to keep the ideal functionality specification independent of this. Hence we allow this quantity to be specified by the simulator we design. Our simulators will always use β ≤ α, but for a general adversary this is enforced by W(F ) by using min β, α instead of β.
invests is not much more than that what is available to A. Below we shall quantify the resource fairness of a protocol by the ratio of the amount of resources that S invests to the actual resources available to A (which technically also includes those available to the environment).
The typical order of quantifiers in the simulation-based security definitions (∀A ∃S ∀Z) allows the ideal-world adversary to depend on the real-world adversary that it simulates, but it should be independent of the environment. This guarantees that in the ideal world, the adversary does not "know" any "secrets" of the environment. A stronger definition of security (which in fact, is equivalent to the original one, in the UC framework) requires the ideal-world adversary to be a "black-box" simulator which depends on A only by making black-box invocations of A. We employ a slight weakening of this definition: we pass the ideal adversary S a bound t on the running time of Z, A , as an input parameter. Note that this still retains the intuitive security guarantee that the adversary cannot depend on the environment, except that we explicitly allow it to depend on t.
More formally we model A and Z as bounded IPRAMs. Our security definition will use the order of quantifiers ∃S ∀t-bounded Z, A , and it will refer to S A (t). To capture resource fairness, we will require that the ideal-world adversary does not have much more resources at its disposal than what the real-world adversary and environment have (namely t, which is the input parameter to the ideal-world adversary). Recall that, apart from expending resources, we allow the ideal-world adversary to invest resources with an ideal functionality. Definition 2.2. An ideal-world adversary S with input parameter t is said to be λ-restricted if there are polynomials ζ 1 (κ) and ζ 2 (κ) such that the sum of all investments sent by S to the ideal functionality is bounded by λt + ζ 1 (κ), and the running time of S is bounded by ζ 2 (κ).
We shall use a λ-restricted simulator (for an appropriate value of λ) to capture the intuitive requirements of security and fairness. However, universal composition does not automatically follow from such a security definition. To see this, consider how the universal composition theorem is proven [11] . In a composed setting with multiple sessions of a protocol, we can single out one session and consider all other sessions as part of the environment. The final simulator in the composed setting is obtained by considering (uncomposed) security for each session singled out in this way. However, in our case we must demonstrate an O(λ)-restricted simulator at the end, and for this we will have to ensure that the environments considered are all O(t)-bounded. (Here t and λ are the parameters from the security of a single session.) This becomes problematic when the honest parties in various sessions may spend more than O(t) time in the panic mode (and hence their running time is not a polynomial in κ independent of t). 14 Hence we need to strengthen our security definition to ensure composability. This is done by adding an extra simulatability requirement, below.
14 One possible way around this problem that one might immediately think of (but is unsatisfactory) is to restrict the environment to granting resources comparable to t , but no more. However, such a restriction would severely restrict the usability of our framework: even when the adversary can afford to obtain its outputs (using less than t amount of resources), such a restriction will not allow the honest players to spend enough resources (which is more than t , in all our protocols) to get their outputs.
The Full Simulator The strengthening of the security definition that will allow us to obtain universal composability is by requiring that, in addition to the simulatability requirement above, there should exist an efficient "full simulator" which can replace A and the honest parties running the protocol in the real world, without an environment being able to detect the change. Intuitively, this is a requirement on the protocol that the resources granted by the environment to honest parties (to compensate for the adversary's computational resources) do not become available to the adversary, indirectly.
More technically, we require that the entire execution in a session-the adversary and the honest parties-can be simulated by X A , where A is the adversary and X is a full simulator that runs in a fixed probabilistic polynomial time. We call it a "full simulator" because it simulates all of the execution of a session to the environment, in contrast to a simulator which does not control the honest parties. In this new scenario, since there are no more honest parties involved in the execution, there is no ideal functionality involved. Such a full simulation would be trivial, because the full simulator has access to all the inputs of A as well as of the honest parties, and it can simply execute the code of these parties in its simulation. The non-triviality comes from another requirement: the running time of the full simulator should be bounded by a fixed polynomial, independent of the resource-requests granted by Z . Thus the full simulator cannot simply follow the protocol for the honest parties, when the honest parties use the resources granted by the environment.
If such a full simulator exists, universal composition becomes possible again. One can isolate one session of the protocol, and consider other executions, including honest parties expending resources granted to them by the environment, as part of an environment whose running time is bounded independent of the amount of resources granted to the honest parties in the other sessions. (See proof of Theorem 2.6 for more details.)
As we shall see, a full simulator is often easy to build. Firstly, since the environment has access to all the inputs to this internally simulated session, we can allow the full simulator also such access. Also, if the protocol is in a hybrid model, we shall require that the full simulator faithfully runs all the functionalities accessed by the protocol. Then, a full simulator can be built as follows: till the panic mode, the full simulator carries out a faithful simulation of all entities, including the honest parties. In the panic mode, the honest parties in our protocols will use the extra computational resources only to carry out the extraction of outputs from commitments; then the full simulator will be able to directly obtain these results (without carrying out the extraction computation) since it controls the functionalities used in the protocol using which commitments and proofs are carried out, prior to entering the output phase.
We shall denote the random variable corresponding to the output produced by Z on interaction with a full simulator X by FSIM X A ,Z . 
Definition 2.3 (Securely Realizing Functionalities
Although the definition above is stated with respect to general functionalities (and this will be useful in proving our composition theorem), this notion of realizing a functionality with λ-investment will be particularly relevant in the case when W 1 is a wrapped functionality, and specifically a wrapped "fair" functionality. To elaborate, let us consider the case where W 1 is W(F ) for some F . (The functionality W 2 can be a wrapped or non-wrapped functionality, i.e., W 2 above can be a non-wrapped functionality like F CRS , or it can be a wrapped functionality which we use as a module in a larger protocol.) Then we make the following definition. Let us give some intuition behind this definition. First, by Fact 2.1, W guarantees that any time a corrupted party (or in particular, the ideal adversary that has corrupted that party) receives its fairdeliver message, then every honest party is at least offered a deal to receive its fairdeliver message, and this deal is bounded by the amount that the ideal adversary invests. Second, by the definition above, the ideal adversary invests an amount within a factor of λ to the resources available to the real adversary. Thus, by expending resources at most a factor λ more than the amount available to the real adversary, an honest party in the ideal world may obtain its message. Since the ideal world is indistinguishable from the real world, the honest party in the real world may also obtain the message expending that amount of resources.
To summarize, we use the term λ-fairly to denote "resource fairness" where an honest party may need to spend at most a factor of λ more resources (i.e., time) than an adversary in order to keep the fair deliveries "fair." Now we consider the case where F is in fact the fair SFE functionality F f (Fig. 1) , and formally define resource fairness and (standard) fairness. Definition 2.5. Let π be a protocol that securely realizes W(F f ) with λ-investment. Then we say π is λ-fair. If λ = O(n), where n is the number of parties, then we say π is resource fair, and if λ = 0, then we say π is fair.
Note that in a "fair" protocol, only a fixed polynomial investment is made by the ideal adversary, and thus all deals are bounded by a fixed polynomial. This could simply be incorporated into the protocol, and thus no deals would need to be made. Thus the protocol would actually securely realize F f . (Of course, as discussed above, if the adversary may corrupt more than a strict minority of parties, then no such protocol exists.)
On Choosing λ = O(n) The intuition behind the choice of λ = O(n) for resource-fair protocols is as follows. As discussed before, since corrupted parties can abort and gain unfair advantage, an honest party needs more time to catch up. In the worst case, there can be (n − 1) corrupted parties against one honest party. The honest party may need to invest a certain amount of work against every corrupted party, but the adversary can adaptively pick a single corrupt party which will use all the resources at the adversary's disposal. This places the honest party at a further factor (n − 1) disadvantage compared to the adversary. Thus, we believe that O(nt) is the "necessary" amount of time an honest party needs against a t-bounded adversary. On the other hand, as we show in the sequel, there exist O(n)-fair protocols in the FMPC framework, and thus λ = O(n) is also sufficient.
Security of Resource-Fair Protocols
Our definition of resource fairness subsumes the UC definition of security. First of all, if a protocol π λ-fairly realizes F , then, by definition it is also a secure realization of W(F ). However it is not a secure realization of F itself, because W(F ) offers extra features. But note that for adversaries which never use the feature of sending an invest message, F and W(F ) behave identically. In fact, F in the original (unfair) UC model of [12] can be modeled using a rigged wrapper: consider W (F ) which behaves like W(F ) except that it does not offer any deals to the honest parties (but interacts with the adversary in the same way: in particular, it allows the adversary to obtain its outputs by "investing" any amount of resources). Except for the round structure we use, W (F ) is an exact modeling of F in the original UC framework. Clearly, W(F ) is intuitively as secure as W (F ) (but is also fair).
A Composition Theorem
We now examine the composition of protocols. It turns out that the composition theorem of the UC framework does not automatically imply an analog in the FMPC framework. The main reason for this is that the running time of a resource-requesting protocol is not bounded a priori, as there is no bound on the amount of time the environment may decide to grant it in response to a request. This is the reason we introduced the full simulator, whose running time is bounded by a polynomial, independent of the environment, and added the extra requirement concerning the full simulator in our definition of security. Using this extra requirement, we are able to prove the composition theorem below. 
Theorem 2.6 (Universal Composition of Resource-Fair Protocols
where λ = λ.
Before proving this composition theorem we make a few remarks. We consider the general situation where π could itself use resources granted by the environment (beyond just forwarding them on to its ρ-subsessions). The bound t on Z, A does not include the amount of resources granted by Z that π itself uses. However we will require this amount to be polynomially bounded (though the polynomial can depend on Z), for otherwise the security guarantee of ρ is not useful. Further, we require that π must have a full simulator, whose running time is bounded a priori, independent of the environment. These conditions on π are trivially satisfied if π does not itself use any granted resources (but only pass them on to the ρ-subsessions), and has a running time-denoted |π|-bounded polynomially and independent of the environment. (Indeed, in our constructions later, we use composition only with such parent protocols π .) In the proof below, for the sake of clarity, we first consider such a π first.
The condition on ρ is that it securely realizes a functionality according to Definition 2.3. In particular this requires that there be a full simulator for ρ. As described below the proof will use this fact.
Proof. The proof follows the same outline as the proof of the composition theorem in the UC framework. Consider any environment Z and adversary A (such that Z, A is t-bounded). We start from the real-world scenario in which π invokes (up to ) copies of the protocol ρ. Through a series of hybrids, one by one, we replace the protocol executions by copies of the functionality W 2 . As we move through the hybrids we modify the adversary; the final one will be the adversary H. At every step we shall show that the output of the environment remains essentially unchanged.
In the first scenario which we begin with, we shall consider a "dummy adversary" A which transparently acts between the environment and the parties in a protocol. This amounts to considering the real-world adversary as essentially a part of the environment Z. Further, we shall consider π also as part of the environment; then the parties running ρ interact directly with the environment, and not with the protocol π . We shall denote this larger environment (which contains the original environment Z, the adversary A, and π ) by Z * . Using our notation for compound IPRAMs, we can write Z * = Z, A, π (or more precisely, Z * ,Ã = Z, A, π ).
For simplicity of presentation, first we consider the case when the protocol π does not generate its own resource requests or use any resources granted to it, but merely passes resource requests and grants between Z and the copies of ρ. (In this case the full simulator for π will not be required.) Then the running time of π can be bounded as |π| independent of the environment and adversary. Since Z, A is t-bounded, then Z * is t -bounded where t = t + |π|. Now, the entire real-world scenario consisting of the environment Z * and the copies of ρ can be represented by Z * , [ρ|Ã] 1 , . . . , [ρ|Ã] . Here [ρ|Ã] i denotes the honest parties in the ith session of protocol ρ, and the dummy adversaryÃ which is the intermediary between Z * and that session. Note that the above notation describes the same system as in REAL π ρ ,A,Z .
Let S and X denote, respectively, the simulator and the full simulator guaranteed by the definition of security of ρ. So to complete the step we just need to argue that Z ,
This should follow from the definition of S. But in fact, at this point the proof breaks down. This is because the new environment that we created, Z is not necessarily O(t)-bounded: the part [ρ|Ã] 2 inside Z may run for much longer than t if Z * grants it a request to that effect. This will prevent the resulting simulator from being O(λ) restricted. (To remedy the situation, one might consider restricting Z * to grant only requests comparable to t, but this would seriously restrict the usability of the FMPC framework.)
It is here that the full simulator for ρ is useful. Simply stated, the plan will be to have [ρ|Ã] 2 above first substituted by a copy of X , [XÃ] 2 . The more formal line of argument is presented below.
≈ Z 1 , XÃ 1 because X is a full simulator (3)
≈ Z 1 , ρ|Ã 1 because X is a full simulator (7) What we gain from using the full simulator is that in step (8) 
which is bounded by i=1 λ|Z i |. Further, |Z i | ≤ |Z * | + (|S| + |Ã| + |W 2 |) ≤ |Z| + poly(κ). The last inequality above follows from the fact that |π|, , |S|, |Ã|, |W 2 | are all bounded by polynomials in κ (independent of A and Z). (Note that S t makes investments dependent on t, but its running time itself is bounded by a polynomial in κ.) Thus, the total investments made by H is at most λ|Z| + poly (κ) (where poly is independent of Z and A). Thus H is indeed λ-restricted.
Finally, we return to the omitted case that π might itself issue resource requests and use resources granted to it. In this case it is not true that Z * = Z, A, π is t +
|π| bounded if Z, A is t-bounded. Instead it is (t + |π| + p(κ))-bounded, where p(κ) is the amount of resources that Z could grant to π . However, p(κ) is not bounded a priori by any fixed polynomial (even in terms of t). As such, the investments made by H = [SÃ] 1 , . . . , [SÃ]
cannot be bounded in terms of t, as above. To get around this situation, we shall rely on the fact that π has a full simulator, and therefore Z * = Z, A, π behaves indistinguishably from another environment which is appropriately bounded (linearly in t).
In more detail, by the security of ρ, we have
where T = t +π +p(κ). Note that the simulators here get T as the bound on the running time of the environment and adversary, and as such may make investments comparable to T . We have used the fact that T is bounded by a polynomial, so that the security guarantee can be applied. Next, we replace π (which uses the p(κ) resources granted by the environment) by its full simulator (which is bounded by a fixed polynomial in κ independent of the environment and adversary).
In the above expression, the full simulator is Y along with the copies of W 2 and honest parties (but not SÃ T , which is considered part of the environment for this step). Finally, we apply the security guarantee of ρ once again to obtain
Here we use the fact that T is still a (generous) bound on Z, A, Y .
Using the above indistinguishability relations, we can set Z * = Z, A, Y (instead of Z, A, π ), and then the running time of Z * is indeed bounded by | Z, A | + poly(κ), for some polynomial poly independent of Z and A. Given this Z * , the rest of the arguments continue to hold as before, and we again obtain that the simulator H that we build is λ-restricted.
In the above theorem, we only used the fact that π has a full simulator. In building large protocols, π is often itself a secure protocol (in a hybrid model) for some functionality. The following corollary considers this setting. Proof. As in the UC framework, this corollary follows from the composition theorem using a simple hybrid argument. However, now we keep track of the total running time of the simulator as well as the total amount of resources it invests, and also ensure that the condition of the full simulator is satisfied.
To show the first condition in the security definition, we need to show a λ -restricted simulator S for the protocol π ρ . We can use Theorem 2.6 to obtain H such that REAL π ρ ,A,Z ≈ HYB
, where | Z, A | ≤ t. The running time of H A (t) is at most |A| + c 1 (where c 1 is some polynomial in κ, independent of t). Further, H is λ -restricted, which means that it invests at most λ t + c 2 units. Thus | Z, H A (t) | ≤ t + λ t + c 3 (counting the total running time and the total amount of resource invested). Now, we apply the security guarantee of π in the W 2 -hybrid model to obtain S such that HYB
S H A (t) (t ),Z , where t = t + λ t + c 3 . Further, the total investment made by S H A (t) (t ) is bounded by λt
The only remaining point to prove is the existence of a full simulator for π ρ . This is done as follows: first one by one each copy of ρ is replaced by a full simulator, by considering everything else as the environment (and using a dummy adversary). Then, in the resulting system everything except π and the (original) adversary is considered as the environment, and the existence of a full simulator for π in the W 2 -hybrid model is invoked. Note that at every step of this sequence of operations we ensure that the constructed adversary is of constant size (i.e., independent of the environment and original adversary), except in the last step, when it contains the original adversary. This guarantees that the full simulator obtained in the end is a constant size one with black-box access to the original adversary.
Remark 2.8. The composition theorem (and the above proof) holds whether we consider the setting of static adversaries or of adaptive adversaries. However, for the rest of this work we restrict ourselves to static corruption, as our protocols in Sect. 3 are proven secure only against static adversaries.
Functionality F R

CPFO
F R
CPFO is parameterized by a polynomial-time computable binary relation R, and the number of parties n. It proceeds as follows, running with parties P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n and an adversary S: (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n )), S)}, s). 
Resource-Fair Protocols
In this section we present protocols which we show to be secure and resource-fair realizations of various functionalities. First we present the "commit-prove-fair-open" functionality F CPFO , and then show how to construct a protocol, GradRel, that securely realizes W(F CPFO ) with O(n)-investment using "time-lines." We then use W(F CPFO ) to construct resource-fair protocols that realize the (wrapped) SFE functionality in the FMPC framework.
The Commit-Prove-Fair-Open Functionality
Functionality F CPFO is described in Fig. 3 . It is similar to the "commit-and-prove" functionality F CP in [15] in that both functionalities allow a party to commit to a value v and prove relations about v. Note that although F CP does not provide an explicit "opening" phase, the opening of v can be achieved by proving an "equality" relation. However, while F CP is not concerned with fairness, F CPFO is specifically designed to enforce fairness in the opening. In the open phase, F CPFO does not require the outputs to be handed over to the parties as soon as the parties request an opening. Instead, it specifies (to W(F CPFO )) a round s in the future when the outputs are to be handed over. We allow the adversary to determine this round by sending a deliverat message to F CPFO .
(Implicitly we assume that if the round number in the deliverat message is less than the current round number, then the functionality will ignore it.) In Sect. 3.2, we shall see that by replacing some invocations to the F CP functionality by invocations to W(F CPFO ), we can convert the universally composable MPC protocol in the CRS model of Canetti et al. [15] (which is completely unfair) into a resource-fair protocol.
Before showing a protocol that securely realizes W(F CPFO ), we present a variant of a cryptographic primitive known as "time-lines" [31] that will play an essential role in the construction of resource-fair protocols. First, the assumptions that these protocols rely upon.
Preliminaries for Protocol Constructions
Let κ be the cryptographic security parameter. A function f : Z → [0, 1] is negligible if for all α > 0 there exists a κ α > 0 such that for all κ > κ α , f (κ) < |κ| −α . All functions we use in this paper will include a security parameter as input, either implicitly or explicitly, and we say that these functions are negligible if they are negligible in the security parameter. (They will be polynomial in all other parameters.) Furthermore, we assume that n, the number of parties, is polynomially bounded by κ as well.
A prime p is safe if p = (p − 1)/2 is also a prime (in number theory, p is also known as a Sophie-Germain prime). A Blum integer is a product of two primes, each equivalent to 3 modulo 4. We will be working with a special class of Blum integers N = p 1 p 2 where p 1 and p 2 are both safe primes. We call such numbers safe Blum integers. 15 The assumptions used in this paper are the composite decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption (CDDH), the decision composite residuosity assumption (DCR), and the generalized Blum-Blum-Shub assumption (GBBS) (in fact, a refined version of it), which we now state.
The CDDH Assumption We briefly review the composite decisional Diffie-Hellman (CDDH) assumption. (We refer the reader to [8] for more in-depth discussions.) Let N = p 1 p 2 where p 1 , p 2 are κ-bit safe primes. Let g be a random element from Z * N , a, b, c random elements in Z N , and A a polynomial-time adversary. There exists a negligible function (·), such that
where the randomness is taken over the random choices of N, g, a, b and c. In this paper, we will use a slight variation of this assumption, where instead of being a random element in Z * N , g is a random quadratic residue in Z * N . We call the new assumption CDDH-QR. Notice that CDDH-QR easily reduces to CDDH. To see this, given a random tuple (N, g, x, y, z) from the CDDH assumption, (N, g 2 , x 2 , y 2 , z 2 ) is (statistically close to) a random tuple in the CDDH-QR assumption.
The DCR Assumption The Paillier encryption scheme [50] is defined as follows, where λ(N ) is the Carmichael function of N , and L is a function that takes input elements from the set {u < N 2 |u ≡ 1 mod N } and returns L(u) = The Generalized BBS Assumption In this paper we use a further refinement of the generalized BBS assumption (GBBS), introduced by Boneh and Naor [9] ; see Appendix B for remarks on the differences between the current formulation and the original one.
Given security parameter κ, let N = p 1 p 2 be a safe Blum integer with |p 1 | = |p 2 | = κ, and let k be an integer bounded from below by κ c for some positive c. 
Now let A be a PRAM algorithm whose running time is bounded by δ · S for some constant δ < 1, and let R be a random element in Z * N . The GBBS δ assumption states that there exists a negligible function (κ) such that for any A,
(11) The GBBS assumption is that the GBBS δ assumption holds for some constant δ < 1.
Intuitively, the assumption says that for any adversary A whose running time is bounded by δ · S, and who sees a collection of points on a "time-line" (formal definition in Sect. 3.1.2) with an arbitrary distribution, a point at distance S away from this collection is still not only unknown, but appears pseudorandom.
Time-Lines
We start with some additional notation. We use QR N to denote the quadratic residues modulo N . In other words, QR N = {x 2 | x ∈ Z N }. For a vector a, we use a[i] to denote the ith element in a. As defined in Sect. 3.1.1, the distance between a number x and a vector a is the minimal absolute difference between x and elements in a; we denote this as Dist(x, a). More formally, assuming that d is the dimension of a, we have Dist(x, a) = min
We now present a definition of a time-line suitable for our purposes, followed by an efficient way to generate them (according to this definition), the security of which relies on GBBS and CDDH-QR. Master time-line L: seed g; points:
Derived time-line L : seed g α ; points: In the rest of the paper, we will sometimes call a decreasing time-line simply a "timeline."
To randomly generate a time-line, one picks a random safe Blum integer N along with g R ← Z * N as the seed, and then produces the points. Naturally, one can compute the points by repeated squaring: by squaring the seed g 2 κ−1 times, we get u [1] , and from then on, we can compute u[i] by squaring u[i − 1] 2 κ−i times; in other words,
Obviously, using this method to compute all the points would take exponential time. However, if one knows the factorization of N , then the time-line can be efficiently computed [9] .
Alternatively, and assuming one time-line is already known, Garay and Jakobsson [31] suggested the following way to efficiently generate additional time-lines. Given a time-line L, one can easily derive a new time-line from L, by raising the seed and every point in L to a fixed power α. Clearly, the result is a time-line with the same modulus. Fig. 4 . Clearly, the deriving method is more efficient than the squaring method, especially at the beginning of the time-line, where the squaring method would take exponential time.
In fact, without knowing the master time-line L, if an adversary A of running time δ · 2 sees only the seed and the last ( + 1) points of a derived time-line L , the previous point (which is at distance 2 away) appears pseudorandom to A, assuming that the GBBS assumption holds. Obviously, this pseudorandomness is no longer true if A also knows the entire master time-line L and the shifting factor α, since it can then use the deriving method to find the previous point (in fact, any point) on L efficiently. Nevertheless, as we show in the following lemma, assuming CDDH and GBBS, this pseudorandomness remains true if A knows L, but not the shifting factor α. We call this property the strong pseudorandomness of time-lines. 16 
Lemma 3.3 (Strong Pseudorandomness
)
. , v[κ]).
Let A be a PRAM algorithm whose running time is bounded by δ · 2 for some constant δ < 1. Let R be a random element in Z * N . Then, assuming CDDH and GBBS δ hold, there exists a negligible function (·) such that, for any A,
Proof. We consider four different distributions and prove that they are all computationally indistinguishable to each other, which shall imply the lemma. At a high level, all four distributions consist of a master time-line L and part of a derived time-line L . However, in two of the distributions, the master time-line is real, while in the other two the master time-line is "faked." Similarly, in two of the distributions, the derived time-line is "faithful," while in the other two the derived timeline is "unfaithful." We now describe these four distributions in more detail. Note that Dist R,F and Dist R,U are the two distributions that A tries to distinguish in the lemma. So if we can prove that all the four distributions are indistinguishable, the lemma is proved. We do this in three steps, as follows: 
κ− −1 , while in Dist F,U X = Q 2 is a random quadratic residue. Notice that S κ−t and Q are both independent from the rest of the elements in their distributions, thus, one can reduce the indistinguishability between Dist F,F and Dist F,U to the indistinguishability between the tuples (g, h,
, which in turn reduces to the CDDH-QR assumption. 17 Dist F,U and Dist R,U are indistinguishable to an A of running time δ · 2 : Same as in the first step, the indistinguishability is reduced to GBBS via a hybrid argument.
Realizing W(F CPFO ): Protocol GradRel
Now we construct a protocol, GradRel, that securely realizes wrapped functionality W(F CPFO ) in the (F CRS ,F ZK )-hybrid model using the time-lines from the previous section. (See Appendix A for a description of the F CRS functionality.) We use the multisession version of the "one-to-many"F ZK functionality from [15] , which is shown in Fig. 5 . 18 In particular, we need theF ZK functionality for the following relations:
• Discrete log:
• Diffie-Hellman quadruple:
• Blinded relation: Given a binary relation R(y, x), we define a "blinded" relation R as follows:
. Intuitively, R "blinds" the witness x using the Diffie-Hellman tuple (g, h, w, z/x). Obviouslŷ R is an NP relation if R is.
We first describe protocol GradRel informally. The CRS in GradRel consists of a master time-line L = N, g, u . To commit to a value x i , party P i derives a new time- 17 We assume that Q and S 2 κ− −1 are powers of g, which only fails with negligible probability. 18 In [15] the framework used is that originally presented in [12] . However, since we are using the modified version from [13] , we modify the functionalityF ZK by explicitly allowing the adversary to block messages from the functionality to the parties. line L i = N, g i , v i , and uses the tail of L i to "blind" x i . More precisely, P i sends z i = v i [κ] · x i as a "timeline-commitment" to x i together with a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge (throughF DL ZK ) that it knows L i 's shifting factor, and thus, x i . Note that any party can force-open the commitment by performing repeated squaring from points in the time-line. However, forced opening can take a long time, and in particular, since v i [κ] is (2 κ − 1) steps away from the seed g i , it appears pseudorandom to the adversary.
The prove phase is directly handled by theFR ZK functionality. The opening phase consists of κ rounds. In the ith round, all parties reveal the ith point in their derived time-lines, followed by a zero-knowledge proof that this point is valid (throughF DH ZK ), for i = 1, 2, . . . κ. If at any time in the gradual opening stage, an uncorrupted party does not receive a ZK-PROOF message in a round when it is expected (possibly because the adversary blocked it, or a corrupted party did not send a proper zk-prove message to anF ZK functionality) then it enters the panic mode. In this mode, an uncorrupted party requests time from the environment to force-open the commitments of all other parties. If the environment accepts, the party forces-open the commitment; otherwise it aborts.
The detailed description of the protocol is given in Fig. 6 . The security of this protocol is based on CDDH, DCR, and GBBS. The δ in the protocol is the constant δ from the GBBS assumption. As a technical note, GradRel assumes that all the committed values are quadratic residues in Z * N . We discuss in Appendix C how this assumption can be removed. Clearly, protocol GradRel uses O(κ 2 n) bits of communication. As mentioned in Sect. 2.1, the protocol employs a broadcast channel for convenience.
Under the assumptions GBBS δ and CDDH hold, we can show an ideal adversary for W(F R CPFO ) that invests nt/δ and produces a simulation indistinguishable from GradRel. Therefore, GradRel securely realizes W(F R CPFO ) with n/δ-investment.
Theorem 3.4. Assume that assumptions GBBS and CDDH hold. Let κ denote the security parameter and n the number of parties. Then protocol GradRel securely realizes the ideal functionality W(F
Before proving this theorem we sketch the essential new elements involving the wrapper. In constructing a simulator S, the most interesting aspect is the simulation of the fair-open phase. Note that the opening takes place in rounds, with the value released in each round being "closer" to the value to be revealed.
• S internally runs the adversary A, and simulates to it the protocol messages from the honest parties. Initially S uses random values to simulate the values released by the honest parties in each round.
• Once the released value gets sufficiently close to the final value, S can no longer use random values, because even a t-bounded Z, A could distinguish between that and the values released by the honest party in an actual execution. So, before reaching that point, S will invest sufficient amount of time with W(F CPFO ) and obtain the value to be opened. 19 Subsequent rounds in the simulation are carried 19 The "sufficient" amount is the same as what an honest party entering the panic mode at this point would have requested the environment. Note that if the simulator were to invest less amount of time at this point, then
Protocol GradRel R
Set-up:
The CRS consists of a master time-line L = N, g, u with security parameter κ. Round 1 (commit phase) For each party P i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, upon receiving input (commit, sid, x i ), do: Send message (zk-prove, sid, 0, (N, g, g i ), α i ) to theF DL ZK functionality. All parties output (RECEIPT, sid, P i ) after receiving (ZK-PROOF, sid, 0, P i , (N, g, g i ) ) fromF DL ZK . Round 2 (prove phase) For each party P i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, upon receiving input (prove, sid, y i ), do:
After receiving messages (ZK-PROOF
After receiving all n RELEASE and ZK-PROOF messages, proceed to the next round.
Otherwise, if any of the broadcast messages are missing, go to panic mode.
At the end of round (κ + 2), compute
. . , x n ) and terminate. Panic mode: For each party P i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, do:
from the previous round to directly compute x j committed by P j as
. . , x n ) in round (κ + 2) and terminate. -Otherwise, output ⊥ in round (κ + 2) and terminate. out using the value obtained from W(F CPFO ) (and hence in those rounds the simulation is perfect).
• At this point a deal is still not offered by W(F CPFO ) to any honest party. But if in a future round, the adversary A causes a RELEASE or a ZK-PROOF message not to reach an honest party P (which in the real execution would prompt P to enter the if the adversary aborts immediately afterwards, the amount of resource requested by the honest party in the real execution will be more than the deal offered by the functionality in the ideal world, and the simulation will not be indistinguishable. On the other hand, if the simulator invests too much time at this point (or invested the amount of resources requisite at a much earlier round) then the simulation will no more be fair.
panic mode), S at that point would request W(F CPFO ) to send a deal to P , with investment required from P being the actual time that the protocol would request the environment then. This amount will be no more than what S invested.
• In the ideal-world protocol, if P receives a deal offer from W(F CPFO ), then it would pass it on to the environment, and if the deal is accepted by the environment, then P will invest the amount of time specified in the deal, and obtain the committed value from W(F CPFO ). In the real-world protocol, if P enters the panic mode it will send the deal offer to the environment, and if the deal is accepted by the environment, then P will use the amount of time specified in the deal offer to force-open the computed value. In either case, the environment sees the same behavior from P .
To show that this simulation is good, we depend on the fact that the values released in the initial rounds of the actual execution are pseudorandom, and that in the simulation S switches to the actual values before this pseudorandomness ceases to hold. The O(n) factor in the amount invested by S is because of the fact that S has to make the advance investment for commitments by all honest parties (at most n), whereas the adversary A might choose to attack any one of them. Recall that the GBBS assumption implies that the GBBS δ assumption holds for some constant δ < 1; the O(n) factor also includes (in the constant) this factor δ.
To prove the theorem we must also show a full simulator. A full simulator is essentially a faithful execution of the adversary and the honest parties. The only non-triviality resides in that its running time should not depend on the amount of resources granted by the environment. This is not a problem, since the full simulator will know the committed values and need not extract it as the honest parties do in the protocol.
Proof.
We construct an ideal adversary (i.e., simulator) S and a full simulator X so that for all t-bounded Z, A we have
First we describe the construction of S and prove the first of the above relations. The construction of the full simulator is straightforward and will be explained after that.
Simulator S. At the beginning of the protocol, S simulates the F CRS functionality by generating a master time-line L = N, g, u just as in the real protocol. Note that since S generates N , it knows the factorization of N . Assume that N = p 1 p 2 ; S sets Λ = (p 1 − 1)(p 2 − 1)/4. Then, during the ideal process, S runs a simulated copy of A. Messages received from Z are forwarded to the simulated A, and messages sent by the simulated A to its environment are forwarded to Z. Furthermore, S also plays the roles of the various ideal ZK functionalities.
We describe the behavior of S as responses to other parties' actions. 
where t is the bound on A's total number of steps, and κ and δ are as in the GBBS δ assumption (Sect. 3.1.1); note that m is positive since t/δ is polynomial in κ. S behaves differently in the first m − 1 rounds of the Open phase from the last κ − m + 1 rounds; the difference lies in the release value used in simulating the uncorrupted parties (i.e., the value x in the message (RELEASE, sid, P i , x) sent by the uncorrupted parties). Once S knows the committed value x i from uncorrupted P i , S can now generate a "real" derived time-line for P i that is consistent with x i . This is done by producing the time-line backward: We know that the end point of the time-line must be z i /x i , and thus the other points should be the roots of z i /x i . More precisely, for each uncorrupted party P i , S computes w i = (z i /x i ) ( 
(κ, z). Actually, the distributions produced by these two experiments are identical. This follows from the fact that the simulated ZK functionalities behave exactly the same as the actual ZK functionalities, and given perfect ZK functionalities, the outputs of the honest parties in Mix are exactly what they would be in HYB, since the committed values that are opened in HYB must be exactly the same as what was extracted from the ZK functionalities Mix. Also, by inspection, the behavior of the parties on deals are indistinguishable.
Next, we show that Mix Z (κ, z) . Again, the distributions produced by these two experiments are identical. This follows from the fact that the distributions of F CRS and the simulated CRS functionality are the same, the distribution of z i values produced by simulated honest parties is the same, and that the values produced in the open phase are the same (even though the values computed at step m and after are computed in different ways). Finally, we show that Mix Full Simulator X . Recall that the full simulator X replaces not just the adversary, but also the honest parties running the protocol. It gets access to all the inputs to all the parties. So the simulation is almost trivial: it can, for the most part, faithfully execute the code of the honest parties and the adversary. However, the running time of X must be independent of the amount of resources granted to it (i.e., granted to the honest parties simulated by it) by the environment. Note that a faithful simulation of the honest parties will result in X 's running time depend on what is granted by Z. So, when a deal is accepted by Z, X cannot carry out the panic mode computations. Nevertheless, it can find the outcome of such a computation. This is because X knows all the values committed by all the parties that it is simulating (as these values are available from the communication with the zero-knowledge functionalities). Thus, we can construct a full simulator X as required by the security and fairness definition, by following the protocol exactly, except for the panic mode computation (which can be avoided as described above).
By "plugging in" the UCZK protocol from [15] 
Resource-Fair Secure Multi-Party Computation
In this section we show how to construct resource-fair protocols that securely realize the (wrapped) SFE functionality in the FMPC framework. At a high level, our strategy is very simple. Typical secure multi-party protocols (e.g., [15, 21, 25] ) contain an "output" phase, in which every party reveals a secret value, and once all secret values are revealed, every party computes the output of the function. We modify the output phase to have the parties invoke the W(F CPFO ) functionality. More concretely, assuming each party P i holds a secret value v i to reveal, each P i first commits to v i and then proves its correctness. Finally W(F CPFO ) opens all the commitments simultaneously.
We now present two constructions that turn MPC protocols in the CRS model [15] and in the PKI model [21, 25] Proof sketch. Consider the MPC protocol secure against malicious adversaries by Canetti et al. [15] . We denote it by π f . Recall that π f is "compiled" from another protocolπ f that is only secure against "honest-but-curious" adversaries. In the compilation process, P i commits to its initial values using a commit-and-prove functionality called F CP , and then for every message m that P i sends in protocolπ f , the compiler makes P i send a zk-prove message to the F CP ideal functionality in protocol π f to prove that message m was computed correctly. The protocolπ f itself consists of three stages-the input preparation stage, the circuit evaluation stage, and the output stage. In particular, the output stage ofπ f consists of each party P i broadcasting its share m i of the output. After the compilation, the output stage in π f consists of each party P i broadcasting m i along with a proof that m i is valid.
We modify protocol π f to make it secure in the FMPC framework. Notice that π f assumes a broadcast channel, which is built into the FMPC framework, and it is rather straightforward to fit π f into the round structure of FMPC-we omit these technical details. The non-trivial modification comes at the output stage, where instead of broadcasting m i , each party P i commits to m i by sending message (commit, sid, m i ) to W(F CPFO ). In the next round, each party P i then sends message (prove, sid, y i ) to W(F CPFO ) to prove the correctness of m i . Here y i is the appropriate string so that the proof to W(F CPFO ) is equivalent to the proof to F CP . Finally, all parties send (open, sid) to W(F CPFO ), which causes it to send the messages m i to all parties using the fairdelivery mechanism described in Fig. 2 . We denote this modified protocol byπ f . π f also incorporates the following modification: if it receives a dealoffer message from W(F CPFO ), then it passes on this message to the environment, as an offer for the output from F f ; if it gets a response from the environment then that will be passed on to W(F CPFO ), and the response from W(F CPFO ) will be used to compute the output from F f (which will be returned to the environment).
Next, we describe an ideal adversaryS for an adversaryÃ in protocolπ f .S is adapted from the ideal adversary S for some adversary A for protocol π f . Below we describe how A is constructed fromÃ, andS from S. 20 A internally runsÃ. Recall that π f is in the F CP -hybrid model, whereasπ f is in the W(F CPFO )-hybrid model. 21 SoÃ may interact with the wrapper (sending messages invest, noinvest, dealoffer), whereas such messages from A will not be entertained by F CP . The adversary A is constructed fromÃ by incorporating the wrapper into it, as follows: the messages thatÃ sends to the wrapper are internally handled by A. Wheñ A sends an invest message (addressed to W(F CPFO )), A will send a deliverat message to F CP , directing it to send the output at that round.
S is obtained by applying the security guarantee of π f from [15] , but is naturally modified to deal with the round structure and the deliverat messages from A. When A sends (deliverat, sid, s) message to F CP then S will send the same message to F f . Then it uses the output obtained from F f to continue the simulation as in [15] .
S internally simulates S, and externally it interacts with W(F f ). If S sends (deliverat, sid, s) to (simulated) F f , thenS will send an invest message to W(F f ) to obtain the output. The amount of resources invested is the same as whatÃ (which is internally simulated by A, which in turn is internally simulated by S and byS) invests (to the wrapper simulated by A).S interacts with the environment throughÃ.
We point out the following chain of actions in the simulation: whenÃ sends an invest message to W(F CPFO ), A sends a deliverat message to F CP , which is forwarded by S to F f , and thenS sends an invest message to W(F f ). Then, the message received from W(F f ) is used byS to respond to S's deliverat message, which in turn responds to A's deliverat message, and then A can respond toÃ's invest message. Also note that from the environment's point of view, during the simulation the honest parties in the W(F f )-hybrid model behave like the honest parties in the actual execution ofπ f , in particular passing to and fro the dealoffer messages corresponding to the W(F f ) functionality.
It is now straightforward to show that from the point of view of the environment, the above simulation byS is a perfect simulation of the actual execution ofπ f with the adversaryÃ. The proof of the corollary follows directly from Theorem 2.6, Corollary 3.5 and Theorem 3.6. 20 One can think of this as a general adaptation of the simulation of an unfair protocol to the simulation of one that is resource fair; in fact, we will be using it again in the construction of Theorem 3.8. 21 To be a little more precise, we cosmetically modify F CP of [15] as follows, so that it resembles the F CPFO functionality in Fig. 3 : we add an explicit open phase (to distinguish it from other proof phases); then in the open phase F CP sends the messages to the parties in round s if the adversary instructs it do so using a (deliverat, sid, s) message. It is easily verified that this modification does not change the arguments in [15] .
Efficient Resource-Fair MPC in the PKI Model
We now show an efficient and resource-fair MPC protocol in the PKI model. (See Appendix A for a discussion on the PKI model.) We first provide some background, and justify our choice of MPC protocol in this model that we will turn into a resource-fair protocol.
Cramer, Damgård and Nielsen [21] proved that for any polynomial-time computable function f (represented as an arithmetic circuit C), there exists a protocol, call it CDN f , that securely realizes F f in the PKI model, tolerating static corruptions, and assuming DCR and DDH. Furthermore, the protocol uses O(κn|C|) bits of communication and proceeds in O(d) rounds, where κ is the security parameter, |C| is the number of gates in C, and d the depth of C. 22 We note that the protocol is only secure (and fair) against less than n/2 corruptions. A crucial ingredient in the construction is a threshold homomorphic cryptosystem (e.g., the threshold version of the Paillier cryptosystem). Values on the wires of C are encrypted, and the parties share the decryption key using a (n, t)-threshold system, so that any (t + 1) parties can jointly decrypt, but any t parties cannot. By avoiding the sharing of values, but instead only sharing the decryption key, the resulting construction is very efficient in terms of communication complexity.
Furthermore, protocol CDN f is proved secure in [21] in a "modular composition" framework [11] , which is somewhat weaker than the UC framework and our FMPC framework. Building on [21] , Damgård and Nielsen [25] then showed an MPC protocol that is universally composable-and in particular secure against an adaptive adversary, corrupting any minority of the parties-which is, up to constant factors, as efficient as the protocol in [21] . In order to deal with adaptive corruptions and still produce a view that is indistinguishable from the adversary's view of a real attack, however, the arithmetic computation performed in [21] must be modified in several ways to allow the simulator to "justify" its actions at any given time, such as for example showing the adversary encryptions that are claimed to contain the inputs of honest parties, even though the simulator does not know those inputs, and be prepared to produce them whenever some of those honest parties get corrupted, as well as using stronger building blocks, such as UC-secure commitment schemes [24] . (We refer to [25] for details.) Since the current paper is only concerned with static corruptions, we opt in the following to strengthen the protocol in [21] with the minimal modifications to turn it into a resource-fair protocol in the PKI model, but we note that in principle the protocol in [25] would also work, resulting however in an unnecessarily ponderous construction. Proof sketch. As mentioned above, we now show a series of transformations to protocol CDN f that converts it into a resource-fair protocol in the FMPC framework.
1. Given that security of CDN f is in the modular composition framework, it does not remain secure under general composition. Specifically, the reason for this is the use in the protocol of standard trapdoor commitments (TC) to construct the zero-knowledge protocols (more precisely, to convert the Σ -protocols [19, 20] into "normal" zero-knowledge protocols), and such commitment schemes may be malleable. Our first transformation consists in replacing the TC schemes by simulation-sound trapdoor commitment (SSTC) schemes [33, 47] . MacKenzie and Yang [47] have shown that this change will make a zero-knowledge protocol universally composable if the underlying protocol has a non-rewinding knowledge extractor, and the zero-knowledge protocols from [21] can be easily modified to accommodate a non-rewinding extractor, using techniques from [33] . As a result, after the zero-knowledge protocols are thus strengthened, it is not hard to verify that protocol CDN f becomes secure under general composition. Note also that there exist very efficient constructions of SSTC schemes, assuming strong RSA [33, 47] . 23 2. Next, we modify the threshold of the cryptosystem so that only when all parties participate can they decrypt an encrypted message. In [21] , two homomorphic cryptosystems are proposed: a threshold version of the Paillier cryptosystem and a system based on the quadratic residuosity assumption and DDH. Both systems admit efficient zero-knowledge proofs and joint decryption protocols. Furthermore, in both systems, the joint decryption phase consists of each party P i broadcasting a single value v i along with a zero-knowledge proof that v i is "correct." After all parties broadcast the correct values, every party can then perform the decryption on its own. We change the cryptosystem to have an (n, n − 1)-threshold. (Of course, by doing this, this intermediate protocol becomes unfair.) 3. Finally, we further modify the joint decryption phase by having all parties invoke the W(F CPFO ) functionality to release their secret information simultaneously. That is, instead of directly outputting their values, each party P i commits to its value v i , proves the correctness of v i , and then has the W(F CPFO ) functionality open all the values simultaneously. In more detail, this is done in two steps: first, the protocol is modified to invoke the version of functionality F CP discussed in the proof of Theorem 3.6, and then the transformation and simulation argument presented there are applied.
After this series of modifications, and assuming that the homomorphic threshold encryption scheme being used is Paillier, the resulting protocol becomes resource-fair in the (F PKI , W(F CPFO ))-hybrid model in the FMPC framework, under the assumptions and complexities stated in the theorem. 23 An alternative approach is to use, instead of SSTC schemes, universally composable commitment (UCC) schemes [14, 24] . As mentioned above, this is the approach used by Damgård and Nielsen [25] , obtaining security against adaptive corruptions. On the other hand, SSTC admits simpler, more efficient realizations than UCC, and thus allows more efficient constructions.
To formulate the composition theorem, one must introduce a hybrid model, a reallife model with access to an ideal functionality F . In particular, this F -hybrid model functions like the real-life model, but where the parties may also exchange messages with an unbounded number of copies of F , each copy identified via a unique session identifier (sid). The communication between the parties and each one of these copies mimics the ideal process, and in particular the hybrid adversary does not have access to the contents of the messages. Let HYB F π,A,Z denote the distribution ensemble of random variables describing the output of Z, after interacting in the F -hybrid model with protocol π . Let π be a protocol in the F -hybrid model, and ρ a protocol that secures realizes F . The composed protocol π ρ is now constructed by replacing the first message to F in π by an invocation of a new copy of ρ, with fresh random input, the same sid, and with the contents of that message as input; each subsequent message to that copy of F is replaced with an activation of the corresponding copy of ρ, with the contents of that message as new input to ρ.
Canetti [12] proves the following composition theorem.
Theorem A.1 [12] . Let F , G be ideal functionalities. Let π be an n-party protocol that securely realizes G in the F -hybrid model, and let ρ be an n-party protocol that securely realizes F . Then protocol π ρ securely realizes G.
The CRS Model and the PKI Model
In this paper we work with both the CRS model and the PKI model. In the CRS model, there is a common reference string (CRS) generated from a prescribed distribution accessible to all parties at the beginning of the protocol. The F CRS functionality simply returns the CRS. The public key infrastructure (PKI) model is stronger. Upon initial activation, a PKI functionality, F PKI , generates a public string as well as a private string for each party. We note that both models can be defined in the UC framework as well as in the FMPC framework.
Appendix B. Remarks on the New Generalized BBS Assumption
We first present the generalized BBS assumption as formulated by Boneh and Naor [9] , and then point out the differences with our formulation of Sect. 3.1.1. Let n be a positive integer representing a certain security parameter. Let N be a Blum integer, i.e., N = p 1 p 2 , with p 1 and p 2 as above, |p 1 | = |p 2 | = n. For g and N as above, and a positive integer k > n , let The (n , n, δ, ) generalized BBS assumption, as presented in [9] , states that for any integer n < k < n and any PRAM algorithm A whose running time is less than δ · 2 k , Pr A N, g, k, w g,k , g
where the probability is taken over the random choice of an n-bit Blum integer as above, an element g R ← Z N and R R ← Z N . We remark the following differences:
1. In the original GBBS assumption the vector a is fixed to a specific pattern. Subsequent work [32, 53] has considered different (fixed) patterns, but without making the necessary modification to the assumption. The pattern needed by the constructions in this paper is similar to the one in [32, 53] ; however, instead of proposing an assumption for another fixed pattern, we propose the current formulation as a reasonable generalization. 2. Note that in the new formulation, the running time of the adversary is no longer necessarily (proportional to) a power of two, as in the original one. Additionally, the split of parameters in the new formulation-κ and k-is needed since, as stated, the original formulation would allow an adversary to run in time 2 Ω(κ) . Using this much time, however, the adversary could factor N and easily distinguish points on the time-line from a random point-indeed, there exist factoring algorithms of running time 2 O(κ 1/3 (log κ) 2/3 ) (see, e.g., [55] for details). The new formulation fixes this problem by setting an upper-bound function of k so that the adversary's running time would not be sufficient to factor N .
Appendix C. Extending Protocol GradRel to the General Case
The GradRel protocol of Sect. 3.1.3 only works if all committed values are quadratic residues. In order to "fake" the commitment to a value x, S needs to fake a time-line commitment z before knowing x. Then, after learning x, S needs to generate a timeline in the "reverse" direction. In particular, S needs to find the 2 2 t −1 th roots of z/x for various values of t. So z/x needs to be a quadratic residue. In the simulation, z is chosen to be a quadratic residue, and thus x needs to be a quadratic residue as well. We can fix the problem in the following way. Observe that −1 has Jacobi symbol +1, but is not a quadratic residue modulo N . Let V be an arbitrary element in Z * N with Jacobi symbol −1. Then for any x ∈ Z * N , exactly one of the four elements {x, −x, xV , −xV } is a quadratic residue. Consider a modified version of protocol GradRel that additionally contains V in the common reference string. When a party commits to a value x, it makes five time-line commitments to x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 , y, where {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 } is a random permutation of {x, −x, xV , −xV } and y ∈ {1, 4, 9, 16} indicates which x i is the x (y = i 2 means that x i = x). Naturally, the party also needs to provide zero-knowledge proofs that these commitments are consistent. In the open phase, all five values are opened.
Obviously, in the case of a premature abort, the uncorrupted parties can still forceopen all five commitments and recover x. Furthermore, S can simulate the commitments and the opening for any x. For the commitments to {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 }, S generates random {z 1 , z 2 , z 3 , z 4 } whose quadratic residuosities modulo p 1 and p 2 are a random permutation of {(+1, +1), (+1, −1), (−1, +1), (−1, −1)}. Then S generates a random quadratic residue w and the time-line commitment for y, since y is always a quadratic residue. When receiving the actual value x, S can find out its quadratic residuosity modulo p 1 and p 2 , and thus can find the correct permutation and fake the opening of {z 1 , z 2 , z 3 , z 4 } to {x, −x, xV , −xV }, as well as the opening of w to one of the values in {1, 4, 9, 16}.
The modified GradRel protocol works for any inputs in Z * N , and its communication complexity is only a constant times that of GradRel.
